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Abstract
The three fundamental pillars that uphold the foundation for preserving and enhancing global
nuclear security are: nuclear disarmament, the prevention of further nuclear weapon proliferation,
and international cooperation to safeguard nuclear materials and strengthen international nuclear
security culture. However, experts argue that when Russian president Vladimir Putin cut
cooperative efforts to safeguard nuclear materials, he endangered the future of all international
efforts for promoting global nuclear security. We argue that Putin’s decision not only
detrimentally erodes the third pillar of nuclear security, but Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine
also bring to bear more threatening ramifications.
Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the international community’s lack of willingness to exert
sufficient pressure on Russia to honor the promises made to Ukraine (in exchange for giving up
nuclear weapons in the 1990s [1]) work against nonproliferation objectives and reach far beyond
the geographic boundaries of the current conflict. In addition, they may disrupt both further
nuclear disarmament and stimulate proliferation of nuclear weapons. The inaction and/or inability
of the international community to resist or reverse Russia’s illegal actions must alarm the
government of any country who—acting on their trust in the international agreements—resists the
push toward nuclearization. If binding diplomatic agreements are seen to only bind one party—
the weaker party—that party will understandably hesitate to entrust any diplomatic document
short of a binding treaty with clear and required enforcement mechanisms. This is especially true
when a country’s national security and ultimately its sovereignty is at stake. If any one of these
nations move toward nuclear status, the atomic dominos will surely begin to tumble, and the
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delicate nuclear equilibrium, a cooperative balance that defines today’s global nuclear security
landscape, will be lost.

I.

Introduction

Over the past several decades the world community, with few nation-state exceptions, has
diligently strived to implement national and international agreements, protocols, treaties, and
cooperative programs that support each of the three fundamental pillars of global nuclear security.
Despite numerous challenges, these efforts have succeeded in moving the world community
forward on its path to a safer and more secure future [2].
According to experts [3], in 1992 about 50 countries had in their possession weapons-usable
nuclear materials. Due to successful international cooperation, by 2015 that number was cut in
half. Australia, South Korea, and Taiwan had all pursued nuclear weapons programs in the past,
but they abandoned the nuclear path in exchange for international agreements guaranteeing their
security. Today, these three countries are signatories of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as
non-nuclear weapons states.
South Africa was the first state to join the NPT after voluntarily abandoning its nuclear weapons
program in 1991. This was a crucial first step in setting a clear course in realizing global nuclear
threat reduction. However, it was just the first step. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union,
newly independent countries (Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) found themselves in possession
of a large portion of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal, materials, and infrastructure. Almost
overnight three new nuclear weapons states were born possessing thousands of nuclear weapons.
The global community found itself in need of repeating the South African success story, but it
was challenged by a much less stable geopolitical environment.
It was in this difficult environment that an intense multinational diplomatic effort produced what
was later considered a hallmark in cooperative global nuclear threat reduction. Ukraine, Belarus,
and Kazakhstan agreed to give up their nuclear arsenals in exchange for a set of explicit security
assurances and economic assistance measures. In the case of Ukraine, these assurances came in
the form of the agreement signed in 1994 known as the Budapest Memorandum.
The example set by these countries, who chose not to pursue their national security with nuclear
arsenal, but chose instead to rely on international law for their ultimate security, was
inspirational. The proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world has been curbed by such
international agreements and also by the underlying trust that countries place in international law
and collective security through cooperation.
Today, experts on nuclear security argue that recent the actions and policies of Russian president
Vladimir Putin are placing in peril the future of international efforts to promote global nuclear
security. The former US Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN), who have for
years led extremely successful nonproliferation efforts, have explicitly stated that the actions of
Russia toward Ukraine place in jeopardy the third pillar of global security: international
cooperation aimed at safeguarding nuclear materials and strengthening nuclear security culture
around the globe [4]. After more than two decades of productive partnership in securing
dangerous nuclear materials and joint efforts to promote nuclear security and prevent nuclear
terrorism, Nunn and Lugar draw the attention of the international community to the fact that
Russia is actively walking away from cooperative efforts, adding that “common-sense
cooperation [on nuclear security] has become the latest casualty of the spiraling crisis in relations
among the US, Europe, and Russia” [4]. Cooperation with Russia in disarmament and
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nonproliferation has been placed in peril by growing political tensions between the US and
President Putin’s administration [5].
The agreement between US and Russia, the cornerstone of the joint efforts, expired in 2013, and
as of December 2014 the Russian government has officially refused to continue cooperating with
the US in securing and safeguarding dangerous materials, putting an apparent abrupt end to a
successful cooperation between the two former rivals [6]. According to Nunn and Lugar, such
actions “send a dangerous message to the international community and represent a major setback
in the global effort to secure nuclear materials” [4].
Apart from a halt in cooperation between two countries, other troubling news regarding nuclear
security came from Russia last year: according to official US-produced 2014 compliance report
[7], Russia is in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which was
signed by the US and the Soviet Union in 1987 and eliminated an entire class of nuclear arms in
Europe including ballistic and cruise missiles with intermediate ranges between 500 and 5,500
kilometers [8]. Today, the US administration claims that Russia is violating the treaty by testing a
ground-launched cruise missile [9]. President Obama has responded to the claimed violation with
a letter to President Putin which stated, according to the New York Times, that Russia started
testing the missiles in 2008, and that the issue was officially addressed by the State Department to
Russian officials in 2013 [9].
We argue that in addition to the clear erosion of the third pillar of nuclear security, there are more
threatening ramifications resulting from the recent actions of Russia in Ukraine. Both further
nuclear disarmament and prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world are
placed in jeopardy by Putin’s actions in the escalating conflict with Ukraine. The ramifications
from this crisis may disrupt each key pillar of global nuclear security.
In reaching this conclusion, we review the history of the denuclearizing of Ukraine, examine the
Budapest Agreement and its consequences, and examine the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict
and the issues of nuclear weapons that have been brought to life during the conflict, as well as the
reaction of the international community to these events. The consequences of these factors are
detrimental to nonproliferation objectives, reaching far beyond the geographic boundaries of the
current conflict.

II.

Nuclear Ukraine and the Budapest Agreement

In late 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed, the newly independent country of Ukraine found
itself in possession of the third largest nuclear weapons arsenal in the world. The Soviet nuclear
heritage in Ukraine included 176 long-range ballistic missiles, 42 strategic bombers armed with
more than 1,800 nuclear warheads, and a well-developed nuclear infrastructure [10]. With such
vast nuclear arsenal in possession of the newly formed state, experiencing serious political and
economic hardships was viewed as a serious security concern on both sides of the Atlantic as well
as in Russia [2].
With the encouragement of the international community, Ukrainian leadership made a historic
decision to denuclearize in exchange for security assurances, economic assistance, and technical
assistance through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. In 1994 Ukraine,
Russia, the US, and the UK entered into an agreement to remove former Soviet nuclear weapons
from Ukraine, later becoming known as the Budapest Memorandum. According to the
Memorandum, Ukraine committed to full nuclear disarmament including: joining the NPT as a
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non-nuclear weapon state, acceding to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, and transferring all
of its nuclear warheads to Russia for elimination within a specific timeframe [11].
Ukraine's actions were not without significant commitments, however, by the other three
signatories. US, Russia, and the UK have pledged to the following (emphasis by the authors):
- “to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine
- to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against
Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations
- to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate, to their own interest, the
exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages
of any kind
- reaffirm, in the case of Ukraine, their commitment not to use nuclear weapons against
any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT except in the case of an attack on
themselves, their territories or dependent territories, their armed forces, or their allies by
such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state” [1]
Moreover, Ukraine insisted on including additional security measures and guarantees: the
signatories have pledged “to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide
assistance to Ukraine, as a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on Nonproliferation, if
Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in
which nuclear weapons are used [1].”
The Budapest Agreement and the tri-lateral negotiations with Russia and the US provided what—
at that time—seemed reliable security assurances as well as expanded economic assistance [10].
In return for giving up its nuclear arsenal, Ukraine was compensated with: substantial economic
and technical assistance, nuclear fuel, and other assistance through the Nunn-Lugar program.
At the time, Ukraine’s decision to give up their nuclear arsenal was widely discussed both
domestically and abroad [12]. Members of the Ukrainian parliament protested the decision of
President Kuchma to relinquish nuclear weapons, claiming that nuclear weapons are the only real
shield from Russia’s aggression and territorial ambitions [13]. Some of the Western experts,
including J. Mearsheimer, advocated against Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons, arguing that
they are the only real guarantee for the security of the state: “It is imperative to maintain peace
between Russia and Ukraine. That means ensuring that Russia, who has a history of bad relations
with Ukraine, does not move to reconquer it. Ukraine cannot defend itself against nuclear-armed
Russia with conventional weapons, and no state, including the US, is going to extend to it a
meaningful security guarantee. Ukrainian nuclear weapons are the only reliable deterrent to
Russian aggression” [12].
However, the skeptical voices were overpowered by the advocates of denuclearization within the
Ukrainian government and abroad.
During a two-year operation, all 1900 warheads were removed from Ukrainian territory. On June
1, 1996, the last nuclear warheads from Ukraine arrived in Russia for dismantling [2].
The Budapest Agreement and the removal of the nuclear arsenal from the territory of Ukraine
was widely considered a major success both for the international efforts to strengthen global
nuclear security and for Ukraine’s self-interest.
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In 2014, however, this evaluation was called into question. Russia’s aggression toward her
sovereign neighbor, eventual annexation of the territory of Crimea, and subsequent indirect and
direct destabilization that led to armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine belied not only a value of the
particular memorandum, but also the broader confidence in diplomatic security assurances and
the guarantees of international law.

III. Russia/Ukraine conflict
The current conflict in Ukraine is rooted in the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution that started with
mass protests in Kiev and other Ukrainian cities after pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych
failed to sign an association agreement with the EU. This unexpected and unpopular decision led
to protests by a large part of Ukrainian population who hoped for stronger ties with the West. The
protests spread to other parts of Ukraine and turned violent when the Ukrainian Special Forces
clashed with the protesters at the Maidan Square in Kiev, resulting in about a hundred civilian
deaths [14]. The protests led to President Viktor Yanukovich’s impeachment and exile in Russia
and the formation of the new government in Kiev [14]. West-leaning politician Petro Poroshenko
was elected president in May 2014.
The Ukrainian revolution was perceived by Russia with great hostility. President Putin publically
accused the EU and the US of staging the protests which he saw as ousting the legitimate
government and promoting the anti-Russian agenda [15]. The new government of Ukraine that
was formed after presidential and parliamentary elections has been repeatedly called
“illegitimate” by the Russian authorities.
The Crimean crisis that led to the annexation of the Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation
took place in the aftermath of the revolution. In late February 2014, after mass rallies in support
of unification with Russia were held across Crimea, the Russian military intervention in Ukraine
started with unmarked military personnel taking control of the governmental buildings in
Sevastopol, forcing the Ukrainian armed forces out of the region and installing the pro-Russian
government [16]. A legally dubious referendum on the status of Crimea soon followed and, based
on the claimed 96.77% vote, the newly independent Republic of Crimea was admitted into
Russian Federation [17]. The referendum was not recognized by the majority of the international
community—including the US and the EU countries.
During the confrontation in Crimea, the Russian president consistently claimed that there were
“no Russian troops in Crimea”, describing the unmarked military forces with heavy weaponry to
be members of the local militia groups [18]. In April during a televised address to the nation,
Putin publically admitted the presence of the Russian troops in Crimea when he stated, "We had
to take unavoidable steps so that events did not develop as they are currently developing in
southeast Ukraine… Of course our troops stood behind Crimea's self-defense forces” [19]. After
the revolution in Kiev, Putin has been consistently proclaiming Russia’s right to protect its
interests as well as protecting rights of the Russian-speaking population of Eastern Ukraine.
Putin’s rhetoric has changed in the past year from talk of protecting Russian citizens in Crimea to
a much wider population of “Russian speakers” in other regions of Ukraine [20].
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Figure 1. Map of Ukraine [21].

From February 2014, major anti-government and pro-Russian protests took place across Eastern
Ukraine bordering with Russia. Protests in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions turned into an armed
separatist insurgence calling for separation from Ukraine. The Ukrainian government responded
with a military counter-offensive against the insurgents.
On July 17, 2014, an international passenger flight of Malaysian Airlines was shot down and
crashed near Donetsk, on a separatists-controlled territory, killing 283 passengers and 15
crew members. The US and German intelligence services claimed that that plane was shot down
by mistake by the pro-Russian separatists. Meanwhile, the Russian government blamed Ukrainian
military [21]. The final investigation of the crash continues.
The clashes between the separatists and the Ukrainian military turned into an ongoing armed
conflict in the eastern region of Donbass. A temporary ceasefire, signed in Minsk, Belarus in
September 2014, was repeatedly violated and eventually collapsed in early 2015 with an
escalation of fighting. Another ceasefire was agreed upon in February 2015 with assistance from
Germany, France, and Belarus. Despite the agreement calling for unconditional ceasefire, at the
time of the writing of this article, fighting continues in Eastern Ukraine.
One key consideration in understanding the full contextual landscape of the crises is the direct or
indirect role the Russian Federation played in the conflict. According to various international
sources, the armed separatist movement in Eastern Ukraine is heavily financed and assisted by
Russia [22]. The Ukrainian military reports intensive movement of troops and equipment from
Russia to aid the separatists. Russian soldiers captured in Eastern Ukraine, testimonies by human
rights groups, and statements by the separatist leaders indicate that Russian military personnel is
directly involved in the fighting [23]. During the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland,
Ukrainian president Poroshenko claimed that Russia has more than 9,000 soldiers and 500 tanks,
heavy artillery, and armored personnel carriers in Eastern Ukraine [24].
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During a recent visit to Ukraine, the US Army's top commander in Europe, Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges,
told reporters that in recent months Russia has doubled the military support for the pro-Russian
separatists in Ukraine: "When you look at the amount of Russian equipment that the proxies were
using prior to the Minsk agreements, that amount has doubled beginning in December into the
hundreds" [25]. Russia has continuously denied any involvement in Eastern Ukraine.
On February 25, 2015, US Secretary of State John Kerry responded in the affirmative when asked
if Russia was lying about not having weapons or troops in Eastern Ukraine, adding that “Russia
has engaged in a rather remarkable period of the most overt and extensive propaganda exercise
that I've seen since the very height of the Cold War” [26].
The armed conflict between the Ukrainian Army and the pro-Russian separatists in Eastern
Ukraine continues, causing heavy civilian and military casualties. Since the beginning of the
armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, more than 4,800
people have been killed and over 1.2 million have fled their homes [24].
In recent remarks made by Vladimir Putin, he insisted that the Ukrainian Army “is not an army,
but a foreign legion, in this case a foreign NATO legion, which, of course, doesn’t pursue the
national interests of Ukraine,” adding that the goal of those troops is not to pursue the national
interests of Ukraine, but instead “achieving the geopolitical goals of restraining Russia” [27]. The
use of such rhetoric might indicate Russia’s groundwork to justify future involvement of the
Russian troops in Ukraine and the possibility of open fighting between the Russian troops and
Ukrainian forces.

IV. Nuclear weapons discussions in Ukraine
As a response to the escalating conflict with Russia, some within the Ukrainian political circles
started to look beyond an immediate call for western help and toward a more proactive means of
guaranteeing their national security, i.e. regaining its nuclear weapons status. Various powerful
political actors, including a number of MPs in Ukraine, advocated for regaining Ukraine’s nuclear
status as the only guarantee of Ukraine's national security, publically calling the Ukrainian
decision to give up nuclear weapons the most severe geopolitical mistake [28].
Mustafa Dzhemilev, a member of the Ukrainian Parliament since 1998, said that he had spoken
directly with Mr. Putin and told him that because of Russia's breaking of the Budapest
Memorandum, "...such arrangements will not be trusted by anyone anymore and that each country
that has financial capacity to acquire its own nuclear weapons will be aspired to go down that
path, and Ukraine is no exception" [29]. Former minister of foreign affairs Vladimir Ogryzko
recently stated, "Ukraine needs to announce that it is walking away from the NPT and
immediately restart the full nuclear cycle and manufacturing of all the components of the
weapons" [30]. In an interview with USA Today in March, Ukrainian MP Pavlo Rizanenko has
expressed similar ideas, “[T]here’s a strong sentiment in Ukraine that we made a big mistake. In
the future, no matter how the situation is resolved in Crimea, we need a much stronger Ukraine. If
you have nuclear weapons, people don’t invade you” [31].
In response to seizure and blockage of the strategic sites in Crimea by the Russian troops, the
Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) made an official appeal to country-signatories of the
Budapest Memorandum, claiming that Russia’s actions directly violate the agreement by “taking
steps aimed at encroaching on Ukraine's territorial integrity and supporting separatism.” The
Parliamentary appeal urged the signatories to take “practical steps to reaffirm their obligations,
enshrined in the Memorandum, according to the principles of the CSCE (Conference on Security
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and Cooperation in Europe) Final Act, to respect Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and
existing borders,” and asked the guarantors to seek immediate aid for Ukraine from the UN
Security Council in case of escalation of conflict with Russia.
A bill calling for the termination of the membership in the NPT and for the restoration of the
nuclear weapons program was introduced in the Ukrainian Parliament in February 2014. This
legislative effort, however, failed to be passed.
Experts argue that the chances of Ukraine making a decision to regain its nuclear weapons status
despite the recent heated rhetoric are very doubtful [13], pointing out that the economic price of
acquiring nuclear weapons would be too great a financial burden for Ukraine to bear. According
to Gary Samore, the former coordinator for weapons of mass destruction on President Obama’s
National Security Council, “Ukraine “does not have a plausible near-term scenario for developing
nuclear weapons” [13].
Of primary concern, however, is not whether or not Ukraine may withdraw from the NPT and reacquire a nuclear arsenal. The primary concern is what may be the ramifications of the violation
of the Budapest Agreement and the West’s inability to keep its stated commitments on future
nuclear negotiations.

V.

International reaction to the conflict

From the beginning of the conflict in Crimea in February 2014, Russia’s actions in Ukraine were
heavily criticized by the international community. Despite strong international condemnations,
sanctions, and repeated public statements of disapproval, Russia’s territorial gains remain intact
and there have been few indications that Western opposition has impacted Putin’s policy
regarding Ukraine.
On March 17, as the pro-Russian protesters together with the Russian military were taking over
administrative buildings and gaining control over government in Crimea, President Obama
condemned Russia’s actions and warned of the consequences, “we’ll continue to make clear to
Russia that further provocations will achieve nothing except to further isolate Russia and
diminish its place in the world. The international community will continue to stand together to
oppose any violations of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and continued Russian
military intervention in Ukraine will only deepen Russia’s diplomatic isolation and exact a
greater toll on the Russian economy” [32].
On March 27, 2014 after Russia had signed the Treaty on Accession of the Republic of Crimea to
Russia, the UN General Assembly approved a non-binding resolution, proclaiming the annexation
of Crimea illegal and affirming its commitment to the "sovereignty, political independence, unity
and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders" [33]. The
resolution had 100 votes in its favor, 11 votes against, and 58 countries abstained from the vote,
showing a broad international consensus in condemning Russia’s actions.
The vast majority of the international community has not recognized Crimea as part of Russia.
Only 7 member states of the UN have made public statements recognizing it. Notably these are:
Russia, Syria, Venezuela, North Korea, Cuba, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua.
Various world leaders have publically called the Russian annexation of Crimea illegal. For
example, British prime minister David Cameron said, "No amount of sham and perverse
democratic process or skewed historical references can make up for the fact that this is an

8

Manaeva Rice et al.: Ukraine At The Fulcrum

incursion into a sovereign state and a land grab of part of its territory with no respect for the law
of that country or for international law" [34]). President Obama confirmed that the Crimean
referendum was conducted against the law stating, “[it] violates the Ukrainian constitution and
occurred under duress of Russian military intervention, would never be recognized by the US and
the international community" [35].
The annexation of Crimea by Russia and the consequential crisis in the Eastern Ukraine have
pushed various countries to introduce sanctions against Russian individuals and entities viewed as
heavily involved in the crisis [36]. The first round of sanctions against Russia was introduced by
the US, EU, and Canada in March 2014, and included travel bans and an asset freeze. Japan,
Australia, and several other countries have proclaimed similar sanctions. The second round was
introduce by the EU and the US in late April, expanding the list of individuals and imposing a
ban on business transactions with a number of Russian companies [37].
The most impactful third round of sanctions was a response to the escalation of fighting between
the Ukrainian military and the Russian backed separatists in July 2014. The EU and the US
jointly expanded the sanctions, targeting vital sectors of the Russian economy including finance,
energy, and defense. The expanded list included trade bans placed on major Russian energy firms
(Rosneft and Novatek), banks, arms makers, and additional individuals and entities [38]. A
number of countries soon followed the lead of the US and EU and joined the expanded sanctions.
Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, defended introducing the sanctions against Russia by
claiming that Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine is violating the terms of the Budapest
Memorandum. "I'm sure that the united European reaction to Russia's actions is the right one. The
fact that Russia violated guarantees of Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, legally
secured by the Budapest Memorandum 1994, cannot be left without consequences," Merkel said
in December 2014 [39].
Vladimir Putin, however, has publicly discounted claims that Russia breached the Budapest
Agreement. According to Putin, the post-revolution Ukraine is a “new state… with which we
have signed no binding agreements” [13]. In addition, Russian officials have repeatedly called the
new Ukrainian government “illegitimate”, thus relieving themselves from following previous
diplomatic agreements.
Further, regardless of the strong comments made by various Western politicians denouncing
Russia for breaking its obligations under the Budapest Agreement, the current crisis in Ukraine
has revealed a serious problem with international security agreements. The Budapest
Memorandum was a political document, not a treaty, and did not include an enforcement
mechanism [10]. According to Christopher Swift from Georgetown University, the
Memorandum’s commitments “are legally binding, but a violation by one of the signatories does
not create casus belli for any party to that agreement” [40]. In an interview with Bloomberg
Business, Swift explained, “there is nothing in the Budapest Memorandum that automatically
triggers a collective defense obligation by an outside power in the event that someone invades
Ukrainian territory or subverts its sovereignty” [40].
According to US Rep. Doug Lamborn, this argument was reinforced by the assistant Secretary of
State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Victoria Nuland, while briefing members of Congress in
March 2014. Lamborn stated, “She said it was a political treaty, not a NATO-type binding treaty,
and so you make political noises and objections and that’s all you can do” [13].
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VI. Consequences for global nuclear security
The aggressive actions of Russia in Ukraine, together with the unwillingness of the international
community to exert sufficient pressure on Russia to honor the promises made to Ukraine in
exchange for giving up nuclear weapons in the 1990s, will have tremendous ramifications not
only for the third pillar of global nuclear security as previously discussed, but also on the first two
pillars: nuclear disarmament, and further state proliferation of nuclear capabilities.
Russian President Vladimir Putin wrote to the American public in the context of US policy
toward Syria in a New York Times opinion piece from September 2013, "If you cannot count on
international law, then you must find other ways to ensure your security... This is logical: If you
have the bomb, no one will touch you" [41]. Putin’s actions toward Ukraine proved this logic to
be valid.
The future actions of any nation cannot be predicted with certainty and a plethora of variables
would certainly shape the calculation of whether or not one chose the path of nuclearization. The
fact, however, that doubts now cloud the assurances which have been effective in containing
proliferation to date is reason enough to cautiously consider the possibilities.
The first primary pillar of nuclear security is the difficult diplomatic push toward disarmament.
Until the events in Crimea, Ukraine’s voluntary disarmament along with that of Kazakhstan and
Belarus were hallmarks of this endeavor. As German Chancellor Merkel has recently said,
however, "After Russia has violated the agreement, what country will be ready to follow Ukraine
and to abandon nuclear weapons?" Merkel added, "A country will see what has happened in
Ukraine, and it will think that the renunciation of nuclear weapons would make it weaker and
more vulnerable to attacks of this kind” [39].
This sentiment was echoed by Alexander Lukashenko, president of Belarus, a former Soviet
Union country that also relinquished its nuclear weapons arsenal in the mid-1990s. He recently
called the decision to abandon nuclear weapons “the most severe failure of his presidency,”
saying that possession of nuclear weapons guarantees protection from the outside pressure [42].
Lukashenko later added that he views the violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine as a
breach of the Budapest agreements: “In 1994, this guarantee was given before my eyes to
preserve the existing borders... [US and UK] as guarantors of the fact that if we abandon nuclear
weapons, we are guaranteed full security, the so-called "nuclear umbrella." And that we all (I
emphasize) will remain independent states within those boundaries that existed at that time. It is
therefore unacceptable that a state violates the territorial integrity that was guaranteed and
captures part in the territory of a state" [42].
Disturbingly, a recent public opinion poll conducted by an independent pollster in Belarus
demonstrated public support for this attitude. According to the poll, 36% of Belarusians support
re-nuclearizing its defense capability in response to events in Ukraine and the new international
environment (Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Studies). Taking into
consideration the fact that Belarus has been heavily affected by the Chernobyl disaster and was
known for strong anti-nuclear attitudes, a third of its population today supporting acquiring
nuclear weapons proves that the ongoing crisis has an effect on public views about nuclear
weapons and national security beyond the borders of Russia and Ukraine. Although 36% is not a
convincing majority, in a country scarred by the legacy of history’s most devastating nuclear
accident, it must be considered noteworthy.
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One non-NPT nuclearized country that may view the Ukraine events as a reason to further stall or
oppose efforts to denuclearize is North Korea (DPRK). Between 2003 and 2009, six party talks
took place (among North Korea, South Korea, the US, Russia, China, and Japan) aimed at finding
a way to move North Korea away from its pursuit of nuclear weapons. These talks failed and the
DPRK is estimated to have 4 to 8 nuclear weapons [43]. According to the Nuclear Threat
Initiative (NTI), North Korea has also expanded its centrifuge program and restarted its
previously shut down plutonium reactor at its Yonbygon site. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un
has indicated his intention of increasing the country’s nuclear deterrence and has even added its
nuclear status to that country’s constitution.
Despite these actions, as recently as January 2015, Kim indicated that he may be willing to
negotiate a temporary nuclear moratorium with a focus on that country’s efforts to develop longrange, nuclear-warhead-capable missiles [44]. While likely another in a long series of diplomatic
false flags, the US has indicated cautious willingness to return to the six party talks. In all
likelihood, a factor that will be in the minds of all negotiators regarding the veracity of any
diplomatic offers or assurances will be the failure of the Budapest Memorandum.
Consequences arising from the Ukraine crisis reach beyond those countries that are already
members of the nuclear club and will directly impact the second pillar of global nuclear security:
the prevention of further state controlled proliferation of nuclear capabilities. At an emergency
meeting of the G7 regarding the escalating conflict in Ukraine, Canadian Prime Minister Steven
Harper charged President Putin with violation of the Budapest Memorandum and warned that
Russia’s takeover of Crimea will have consequences beyond Ukraine or even Europe, saying that
“by breaching that guarantee, President Putin has provided a rationale for those elsewhere who
needed little more than that already furnished by pride or grievance to arm themselves to the
teeth” [45].
An estimated 30 nations have the ability and/or resources to acquire nuclear capabilities [46].
Many of these including Japan, South Korea, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia have chosen to not pursue
a nuclear course because of the security guarantees afforded them under international agreements
such as the NPT and bilateral security agreements.
Currently, the most potentially volatile of these countries is Iran. As intense negotiation between
the US and Iran move toward a yet-to-be defined future, and as a series of meetings
between Iran and some of the six powers—the US, Russia, China, Britain, France,
and Germany—is pending, Iran is being asked to rely on the assurances and guarantees of the
world community, assurances it now must view through the prism of broken and ignored
assurances made to Ukraine.
If Iran chooses to proceed on the nuclear path, other countries in the region will be obliged to
either trust security agreements from the international community or pursue a weapons program
of their own. The key element to this choice is the degree of confidence they have in, again, the
assurances that have been found impotent in the case of Ukraine.
More broadly, it is not beyond the scope of reason to expect, at a minimum, discussion at
significant levels of a number of governments about whether or not relying on the promises of a
nuclear umbrella is sufficient for national self-preservation. If any one of these nations moved
toward nuclear status, the atomic dominos would surely begin to tumble, and the delicate nuclear
equilibrium that defines global nuclear security today would be a status of the past.
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In addition, the risk of increased state-sponsored nuclear programs leads inevitably to increased
opportunity for non-state acquisition of nuclear material. Further proliferation of nuclear weapons
among nation-states will raise the threat of non-state nuclear terrorism, nuclear smuggling, and
other related issues to a level that will seriously threaten the security of the US and its allies. As
Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn argued in a Wall Street Journal article, “the growing number
of nations with nuclear arms and differing motives, aims, and ambitions poses very high and
unpredictable risks and increased instability” [47].

VII. Conclusions
No international effort to reverse the annexation of Crimea or to stop Russia’s continued
destabilization of the broader Easter Ukraine region has been successful. In fact during a March
8, 2015 meeting of EU foreign ministers, it was decided that despite Russia’s refusal to withdraw
from the illegally acquired Crimea region and despite its refusal to admit to or cease its
destabilizing efforts in Eastern Ukraine, the EU will refrain from imposing additional sanctions
on Russia. The basis of this decision is that the recently signed Minsk ceasefire agreement has
resulted in a slowing of fatalities. Spain's Minister of Foreign Affairs Jose Manuel GarciaMargallo summarized this sentiment by saying, “In my opinion, we must not make any other
steps, we have to give peace a chance” [48]. The message to the Ukrainian government, Russia,
and to the world community is clear: Russia’s utter disregard of the Budapest Memorandum will
be allowed; his acquisition of Crimea will stand and his aggressive disregard of the UN Charter’s
Article 5 will be ignored.
To the government of any country who has resisted the push toward nuclearization based on
international agreements, the inactions and/or inability of the international community to resist or
reverse Russia’s illegal actions must cause great concern. If binding diplomatic agreements are
seen to only bind one party—the weaker party—that party will understandably be very hesitant to
place full faith in any diplomatic document short of a binding treaty that has clear and required
enforcement mechanisms. This is especially true when the stakes are a country’s national security
and, ultimately, its sovereignty.
Today, non-nuclear weapons states see an international community wherein aggression is
contained not by international law and agreements, but only by the restraint that the possession of
nuclear weapons demand. These states read the logic suggested by Putin in his previously
mentioned opinion piece to the American public that having nuclear weapons assures a nation’s
security more than international law, and they see this logic played out through Russia’s actions
in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.
Although many factors may dictate that these states remain non-nuclear, the very possibility that
they may attempt nuclearization should be considered as part of the broad global nonproliferation
dialogue. Some experts may say that this possibility is too remote to be considered a factor when
discussing future endeavors and/or strategies supporting nonproliferation. However, when
examining a matter that if realized would lead to the erosion of nuclear global equilibrium, logical
possibilities, even those considered remote, should be carefully examined and monitored.
The failure of the Budapest Memorandum has the long-term potential to result in the erosion of
each of the three basic pillars of nuclear nonproliferation. For this reason it is incumbent on the
international community to diligently and pro-actively work to see that this possible eventuality
does not rise into reality.
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In order to achieve this, the international community should consider the development of a
systematic three-level monitoring endeavor:
Technical monitoring: As more and more nations develop nuclear power programs, the
challenge of effectively safeguarding against weapons proliferation becomes even more difficult
than the current regime. The IAEA is responsible for monitoring civilian programs in NPT
signatory states through their safeguards agreements, yet the tools the inspectors can bring to bear
are limited and have weaknesses in detecting the diversion of materials.
This is especially important in the uranium enrichment industry where essentially all enrichment
has transitioned to gas centrifuge enrichment plants [49] which are smaller, more difficult to
detect, and easier to reconfigure for proliferation than the older gaseous diffusion technology.
Improving the technology available to the inspector during the on-site inspections as well as
developing higher-fidelity, remote monitoring systems is critical to strengthening the confidence
that the host nation is meeting its commitments under the NPT.
One of the key challenges for the international community is early detection of proliferation
activities. While it would be ideal if the IAEA could be the agent of those discoveries, the reality
is that the IAEA will likely never have the resources or authority to conduct the sort of
information gathering necessary to fully meet that mission. Intelligence organs of nation-states
will continue to play an important role in detecting possible proliferant activities as well as
potential transfers/losses to sub-state actors. IAEA member states may or may not choose to share
some of that information with the IAEA, which then puts a burden of veracity assessment on the
Agency that also requires better technical capabilities both in terms of assessing the information
provided as well as any inspections that are warranted.
Policy/Political monitoring: In addition to the need for enhanced technical monitoring, there
exists a need to more systematically track policy discussions and public discourse relating to
nuclear policy and security threats taking place within those states capable of moving toward
nuclear status. The rise in discourse among non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) centering on the
“humanitarian consequences” [50] does not negate the possibility of a shift in debate toward
assuring self-preservation through nuclearization rather than international agreements. Increased
monitoring and analysis of related public policy dialogue would aid in recognizing such shifts at
their onset. Benchmarking the current opinions of policy makers and elected officials from the
various NNWS would further clarify any future trends that differ from the status quo.
This monitoring would include statements by elected officials and policy makers as well as news
coverage of the nuclear proliferation and security issues in countries of interest recognizing that
such discussion must be analyzed as either being meant for purely internal rhetorical consumption
or meant for actual policy implementation.
Public Opinion Monitoring: Research on state behavior has demonstrated that there are external
and internal pressures that compel governments to make choices both in foreign policy realm and
on national security issues. Domestic public opinion is creating boundaries within which national
governments operate; thereby, it restrains political options for decision makers. At the same time,
in order to generate support for policies and to boost popular support, governments can
manipulate domestic public opinion. As the example of the Pakistani nuclear program has
demonstrated, popular support for certain policy choices that the government presents to domestic
publics under the auspices of enhancing national security (obtaining nuclear weapons to
guarantee security from outside threats in the Pakistani case) can overrun external pressures that
run counter to these policy choices.
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Thus, maintaining the present global security equilibrium based on current international
agreements depends—to a great extent—on domestic public opinion in key countries;
specifically, it depends on attitudes about national security and outside threats. Monitoring
international public opinion in countries that have the capability to alter the global nuclear
security equilibrium will allow for better understanding of the public opinion climate in the
selected countries, and it will give an opportunity to predict situations where the governments of
those states can choose an option of going nuclear.
As stated in the beginning of this paper, the success of global nuclear security rests on the
strengths of three primary pillars. The decision by a single, currently non-nuclear state to start a
nuclear weapons program based on the erosion of these pillars could trigger a domino effect in
which other nations seek security assurance via nuclear weapons rather than through international
agreements. The resulting furthering proliferation of nuclear weapons would greatly increase the
risk of eventual nuclear conflict and also raise the threat of non-state nuclear terrorism, nuclear
smuggling, and other related issues to a level that will seriously threaten the security of the US
and its allies.
As the global community looks toward the next chapter in its nonproliferation efforts, it should
recognize that the actions and inactions of that community in relation to the trustworthiness of its
international agreements can serve to weaken those primary pillars thereby jeopardizing global
security. The breaking of the Budapest Agreement is a matter of history. It is the impact of this
fact that is yet-to-be-determined. It is the hope of the authors, however, that the three levels of
monitoring discussed above would serve as harbingers, if regrettably, of a sliding away from the
stable and secure path of nuclear nonproliferation that is essential to our future global security.

14

Manaeva Rice et al.: Ukraine At The Fulcrum

VIII.

Works Cited

1.

The Budapest Memorandum at 20: The United States, Ukraine and Security Assurances.
Brook. Inst., (available at http://www.brookings.edu/events/2014/12/09-budapestmemorandum-russia-ukraine-nonproliferation-pifer-einhorn).

2.

S. Pifer, The Trilateral Process: The United States, Ukraine, Russia and Nuclear Weapons.
Brook. Inst., (available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/05/trilateralprocess-pifer).

3.

GAO, in press (available at
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA403144).

4.

S. Nunn, R. Lugar, The United States and Russia must repair their partnership on nuclear
security. Wash. Post (2015), (available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/theunited-states-and-russia-must-repair-their-partnership-on-nuclearsecurity/2015/01/23/555b9a60-a271-11e4-903f-9f2faf7cd9fe_story.html).

5.

A. F. Woolf, “Next Steps in Nuclear Arms Control with Russia: Issues for Congress” (7–
5700, Congressional Research Service, 2014), (available at
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43037.pdf).

6.

B. Bender, Russia ends US nuclear security alliance: Accord worked to keep stockpiles
secure. Boston Globe (2015), (available at
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2015/01/19/after-two-decades-russia-nuclearsecurity-cooperation-becomes-casualty-deterioratingrelations/5nh8NbtjitUE8UqVWFIooL/story.html).

7.

B. of P. A. Department Of State. The Office of Website Management, 2014 Compliance
Report (2014), (available at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2014/).

8.

E. Board, Stop the nuclear treaty breakdown before it escalates. Wash. Post (2014),
(available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/stop-the-nuclear-treaty-breakdownbefore-it-escalates/2014/12/28/c08ef924-820c-11e4-81fd-8c4814dfa9d7_story.html).

9.

K. DeYoung, U.S.: Russia violated 1987 treaty by testing ground-launched missiles. Wash.
Post (2014), (available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/usrussia-violated-1987-treaty-by-testing-ground-launched-missiles/2014/07/28/ec95b00616c0-11e4-85b6-c1451e622637_story.html).

10.

D. G. Kimball, Ukraine, Russia, and the NPT (2014), (available at
http://armscontrolnow.org/2014/03/08/ukraine-russia-and-the-npt/).

11.

Profile for Ukraine | NTI. NTI Nucl. Threat Initiat., (available at
http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/ukraine/).

12.

J. J. Mearsheimer, The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent. Foreign Aff. 72.3, 50–66
(1993).

13.

M. Crowley, Don’t Worry, Ukraine Won’t Go Nuclear. Time (2014), (available at
http://time.com/21934/ukraine-crimea-russia-nuclear-weapons/).

15

International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol. 1 [2015], No. 1, Art. 7

14.

H. Alexander, Ukraine revolution: Tuesday February 25 as it happened (2014), (available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10659755/Ukraine-revolutionlive.html).

15.

R. Oliphant, Vladimir Putin: we must stop a Ukraine-style “coloured revolution” in Russia Telegraph. The Telegraph (2014), (available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11243521/Vladimir-Putin-wemust-stop-a-Ukraine-style-coloured-revolution-in-Russia.html).

16.

J. Simpson, Russia’s Crimea plan detailed, secret and successful (2014), (available at
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26644082).

17.

S. Shuster, Putin’s Man in Crimea Is Ukraine’s Worst Nightmare. Time (2014), (available at
http://time.com/19097/putin-crimea-russia-ukraine-aksyonov/).

18.

K. Lally, W. Englund, Putin says he reserves right to protect Russians in Ukraine - The
Washington Post. Wash. Post (2014), (available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-reserves-the-right-to-use-force-inukraine/2014/03/04/92d4ca70-a389-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html).

19.

A. Anischchuk, Putin admits Russian forces were deployed to Crimea. Reuters UK (2014),
(available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/04/17/russia-putin-crimeaidUKL6N0N921H20140417).

20.

Transcript: Putin says Russia will protect the rights of Russians abroad. Wash. Post (2014),
(available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-putin-says-russia-willprotect-the-rights-of-russians-abroad/2014/03/18/432a1e60-ae99-11e3-a49e76adc9210f19_story.html).

21.

B. Bennett, U.S. officials believe attack against Malaysian plane was mistake. Los Angel.
Times, (available at http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-ukraine-intelligence-us20140722-story.html).

22.

G. Baczynska, A. Vasovic, Pushing locals aside, Russians take top rebel posts in east
Ukraine. Reuters (2014), (available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/27/usukraine-crisis-rebels-insight-idUSKBN0FW07020140727).

23.

T. Parfitt, Secret dead of Russia’s undeclared war - Telegraph. The Telegraph (2014),
(available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11314817/Secretdead-of-Russias-undeclared-war.html).

24.

Russia has 9,000 troops in Ukraine - President Poroshenko. BBC News (2015), (available at
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30913027).

25.

K. Wong, Gen. Hodges: Russia doubles support to Ukraine rebels. TheHill (2015),
(available at http://thehill.com/policy/defense/230329-gen-hodges-russia-doubles-supportto-ukraine-rebels).

26.

Russia has lied about its activities in Ukraine: John Kerry. IBNLive (2015), (available at
http://www.ibnlive.com/news/world/russia-has-lied-about-its-activities-in-ukraine-johnkerry-969346.html).

16

Manaeva Rice et al.: Ukraine At The Fulcrum

27.

Putin: Ukraine army is NATO legion aimed at restraining Russia. Russ. Today (2015),
(available at http://rt.com/news/226319-putin-nato-russia-ukraine/).

28.

H. Hall, N. Manayeva, D. Rice, Opinion: Is Ukraine about to go nuclear again? - CNN.com.
CNN (2014), (available at http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/16/opinion/hall-ukraine-russiaputin-nuclear/index.html).

29.

S. Gutterman, Crimean Tatar leader tells Putin secession would break post-Soviet pact.
Reuters (2014), (available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/12/us-ukraine-crisisputin-crimean-idUSBREA2B1CM20140312).

30.

If Ukraine does not get help, it is necessary to produce nuclear weapons - Ogrizko. Indep.
News Bur. (2014).

31.

O. Dorell, Ukraine may have to go nuclear, says Kiev lawmaker. USA TODAY (2014),
(available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/03/10/ukrainenuclear/6250815/).

32.

Statement by the President on Ukraine. whitehouse.gov (2014), (available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/20/statement-president-ukraine).

33.

United Nations, General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to
Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases
(2014), (available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ga11493.doc.htm).

34.

N. Watt, Ukraine: UK to push for tougher sanctions against Russia over Crimea. the
Guardian, (available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/18/ukraine-uk-pushsanctions-russia-crimea).

35.

L. Smith-Spark, D. Magnay, N. Paton Walsh, Ukraine crisis: Early results show Crimea
votes to join Russia - CNN.com. CNN News (2014), (available at
http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/16/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/index.html).

36.

Ukraine crisis: EU and US impose sanctions over Crimea. BBC News (2014), (available at
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26613567).

37.

U.S. levels new sanctions against Russian officials, companies - World. Haaretz.com
(2014), (available at http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/1.587764).

38.

Third Wave of Sanctions Slams Russian Stocks | Business. Mosc. Times (2014), (available
at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/new-sanctions-wave-hits-russianstocks/503604.html).

39.

J. Finley, Merkel: “Consequences” for Russia’s actions toward Ukraine - UPI.com (2014),
(available at http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2014/12/08/Russia-must-faceconsequences-for-violating-Ukraines-sovereignty-says-Merkel/6031418065124/).

40.

T. Atlas, Ukraine Gave Up Nuclear Arms in 1994 Deal Russia Flouts. Bloomberg.com
(2014), (available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-05/ukraine-gaveup-nuclear-arms-in-1994-deal-russia-flouts).

17

International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol. 1 [2015], No. 1, Art. 7

41.

V. V. Putin, What Putin Has to Say to Americans About Syria. N. Y. Times (2013),
(available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-fromrussia-on-syria.html).

42.

S. Bohdan, Lukashenka regrets he is left without nuclear weapons. Belarus Dig., p. March
7, 2014.

43.

Nuclear Disarmament North Korea | NTI. NTI Nucl. Threat Initiat. (2014), (available at
http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/north-korea-nuclear-disarmament/).

44.

A. P. in Washington, North Korea nuclear chief meets with US negotiators amid standoff.
the Guardian (2015), (available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/18/northkorea-nuclear-chief-meets-with-us-negotiators).

45.

Agence France Presse, Canada’s Harper Says Putin’s Russia Spurs Nations to “Arm to
Teeth.” Agence Fr. Presse (2014), (available at
http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/123519).

46.

R. C. Karp, Ed., Security with Nuclear Weapons?: Different Perspectives on National
Security (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford  ; New York  : Solna,
Sweden, 1991).

47.

G. P. Shultz, W. J. Perry, H. A. K. A. S. Nunn, Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear
Proliferation. Wall Str. J. (2011), (available at
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703300904576178760530169414).

48.

“Give peace a chance, decide sanctions later”: EU split over extension, new Russia
penalties, (available at http://rt.com/news/238733-eu-ministers-russia-sanctions/).

49.

D. Vermillion, H. L. Hall, “Profiles of World Uranium Enrichment Programs - 2014”
(ORNL Technical Report, 2015).

50.

United Nations, Discourse Shifts in First Committee from Cold War “Balance of Terror”
Logic against Nuclear Weapon Use to Catastrophic Humanitarian Impacts | Meetings
Coverage and Press Releases (2013), (available at
http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/gadis3483.doc.htm).

IX. Authors’ Bio and Contact Information
Natalie Manaeva Rice is a research assistant at the University of Tennessee (UT) Institute for
Nuclear Security, a PhD candidate at UT, and a Fellow at the Independent Institute of SocioEconomic and Political Studies (IISEPS). Her research interests are in global security and public
policy with special focus on nuclear security, mass media, and public opinion. Her other
interests include anti-Americanism and its impact on international relations, as well as political
communication in transitional societies (Eastern Europe, CIS countries, and Russia). Natalie has
published articles in various journals, including Columbia University's Journal of International
Affairs, and she has co-authored three book chapters on the problems of mass media and public
opinion in post-Soviet states. She is a member of the American Association for Public Opinion
Research (AAPOR), Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication
(AEJMC), and European Communication Research and Education Association
(ECREA). Contact: Natalie.manaeva@gmail.com	
  

18

Manaeva Rice et al.: Ukraine At The Fulcrum

	
  
Dean Rice is a Global Security Fellow with the UT Institute for Nuclear Security. He is also an
adjunct faculty member at the UT College of Communication and Information. He has spent
the past 20 years moving among federal legislative positions, political consulting, and
teaching. As a legislative aide for both the US Senate and the House of Representatives, Rice
focused on issues relating to energy, science and technology, and national defense. His research
interests include global security and democratic development and sustainability in transitional
societies, including post-Soviet countries and the Middle East. He is a member of the national
advisory board for the Syrian Emergency Task Force (SETF) and an alumnus of the American
Council of Young Political Leaders. In 2013, Rice received the Society of Universal
Dialogue’s Atlantic Institute Peace Award in recognition of his efforts in intercultural
engagement and dialogue. Contact: deanricetn@gmail.com	
  
Howard L. Hall is the director of the Institute for Nuclear Security. He is appointed as the UT
and Oak Ridge National Laboratory Governor’s Chair Professor of Nuclear Security and serves
on the faculty of both the Department of Nuclear Engineering and the Bredesen Center For
Interdisciplinary Research and Graduate Education. Hall is also a Senior Fellow in Global
Security Policy at the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy, where he directs the Baker
Center’s Global Security Programs. Contact: Howard.Hall@utk.edu

19

